Implications of China's Rise

By Maj Gen Sheru Thapliyal

Link of the article: http://www.indiandefencereview.com/IDR-Updates/Implications-of-Chinas-Rise.html

The English geographer Sir Halford Mackinder ended his famous 1904 article, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” with a disturbing reference to China. After explaining why Eurasia was the geostrategic fulcrum of world power, he posited that the Chinese, should they expand their power well beyond their borders, “might constitute the yellow peril to the world’s freedom just because they would add an oceanic frontage to the resources of the great continent, an advantage as yet denied to the Russian tenant of the pivot region.”

Leaving aside the sentiment’s racism, which was common for the era, as well as the hysterics sparked by the rise of a non-Western power at any time, Mackinder had a point: whereas Russia, that other Eurasian giant, basically was, and is still, a land power with an oceanic front blocked by ice, China, owing to a 9,000-mile temperate coastline with many good natural harbors, is both a land power and a sea power. (Mackinder actually feared that China might one day conquer Russia.)

On the other hand, is the humbling realization that presently, despite its double digit growth and growing influence, China is not in a position to viably compete with these states in all spheres.

China’s virtual reach extends from Central Asia, with all its mineral and hydrocarbon wealth, to the main shipping lanes of the Pacific Ocean. Later, in Democratic Ideals and Reality, Mackinder predicted that along with the United States, China would eventually guide the world by “building for a quarter of humanity a new civilization, neither quite Eastern nor quite Western.”

The continued growth of China’s comprehensive national power, including its military capabilities, and the manner in which a strong resurgent China will employ this power will have far-reaching consequences both for Asia and the world. The Chinese leadership’s commitment to build Comprehensive National Power (CNP) and leveraging its Strategic Configuration of Power (SCP) to achieve its strategic interests remain a major factor in shaping the future stability and security of Asia. China, as it consolidates its power over the next couple of decades is likely to have a multi-dimensional impact upon other states of the Asia-Pacific region, an assessment broadly accepted by the strategic community the world over.

Most of these countries are likely to be affected by Beijing’s changing economic and military capabilities, its trade and defence policies, its approach towards resolution of bilateral disputes, and the manner in which it will leverage this power. India, which too is rapidly developing as a strong economic and military power, will be greatly impacted by these developments particularly as both countries share common strategic space in Asia.

China with an innate desire to enhance its CNP, seems to be able to match sets growing military power with its economic strategy and successfully link it to the direction of its foreign policy. A unique feature has been the contradictory manner in which the Chinese political elite perceive the world.

China seeks to lead a “unipolar Asia” and is using the concept of “multipolarity” as a smokescreen to facilitate its dominance in Asia.

On the one hand, within the concept of a unipolar world, which is viewed through the prism of a perpetual struggle against the hegemonistic forces of a super power (which would mean US in common parlance) as well as the aspiration for regional leadership in a region dominated by major emerging powers like India, Japan, and Russia (despite the relationship of strategic partnership with the latter). On the other hand, is the humbling realization that presently, despite its double digit growth and growing influence, China is not in a position to viably compete with these states in all spheres.

This undoubtedly imposes certain constraints on its foreign policy necessitating certain rearrangement in its foreign policy objectives/priorities.

Even in the United States there is a growing recognition that following Soviet disintegration, and Japanese power contained within the US–Japan alliance, China will be the leading challenger to its future geopolitical aspirations in Asia-Pacific. China is emerging as a ‘peer’ competitor and an alternative center of power and influence in the region.

Analysts are of the view that United States determination to preserve its status of global pre eminence and China’s determination to reassert its historical and traditional dominant position in Asia is likely to lead to unavoidable and inevitable Sino-US rivalry. This will impact on virtually every international issue and in all parts of the world, with Asia bearing the brunt. The dimension and manner in which competition unfolds will to a degree determine the course of future security situation in Asia-Pacific.

China’s Role in Asia

It needs to be acknowledged that China’s growing power and expanding role in Asia is not only likely to continue but the trend could get accelerated over the next two decades, barring an unforeseen internal crisis in China. In geostrategic terms states across Asia are likely to be “sucked” into the Chinese economic vortex through increasing economic ties, resources relationships, and investments in infrastructure. As one analyst recently observed that China’s Asian strategy is linked directly to its multinational strategy – using multilateral and regional organizations to bolster its economic and political ties across Asia – which supports its modernization strategy.

It is important for India to maximize the “arc of advantage” by strengthening relationships with key countries in Asia – Japan, Israel, Vietnam, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and Iran – as well as Australia.

As a result, Asian economies are getting increasingly intertwined with China, which, is beginning to have geopolitical implications for Asia in general and India in particular. An interesting aspect that emerged during a recent international Scenario Building Seminar in Canberra, Australia was the likely problem faced by the US in managing existing alliances in Asia in the backdrop of growing economic integration of Asian economies with China.

There should be no doubt that the underlying aim of the current Chinese leadership is to make China a great power – “world class, second to none” – and that to achieve this goal, the Chinese are consciously and unwaveringly erecting the building blocks of comprehensive national power. Chinese leaders understand that the hard power (e.g., military and economic power) the country has been accumulating over the past 15 years can easily be translated into soft power that enables it to dissuade and deter other states’ behavior.

China’s growth and activities in Asia underscore the importance and urgency for India’s economic success and emergence as a major regional player. Underlying is the central importance of successful economic reforms and growth, particularly if India seeks to play a balancing role in Asia, and wants to be accepted as the preferable strategic partner, and above all taken seriously. In fact policy makers/academics from Asian states, particularly from Southeast Asia, and to a degree Japan and Taiwan would like to see India accelerating economic reforms and improve economic infrastructure in order to provide alternative choices.

It is important for India to maximize the “arc of advantage” by strengthening relationships with key countries in Asia – Japan, Israel, Vietnam, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and Iran – as well as Australia. The underlying theme of Indian Prime Minister’s initiative for strategic understanding with the US despite major criticism is underscored by above realization.

Chinese Balance of Power Strategy in Asia

This is predicated on the fact that China seeks to lead a “unipolar Asia” and is using the concept of “multipolarity” as a smokescreen to facilitate its dominance in Asia. To achieve this broad geostrategic objective that is in tune with the propensities of Middle Kingdom, it is attempting a twin track strategy. One, it is incrementally maximizing the power gap between strong Asian neighbours – Japan, India, and Russia.

The US wants a unipolar world and a multipolar Asia, China wants a unipolar Asia and a multipolar world.

As also by pitting Pakistan against India, North Korea against Japan and South vs North Korea it is attempting to keep its potential Asian rivals preoccupied. In addition, China is using states such as Iran, Myanmar, and Bangladesh etc. as pawns in its balance of power strategy. Secondly, it is using soft power in terms of political and economic engagement to incrementally enhance its strategic space in Asia.

Its eventual aim is to contain the influence of beleaguered United States to become a pre-eminent power in Asia particularly in terms of economic and strategic dominance. This scenario however is predicated on Chinese perspective on the medium and long term implications of ‘India’s rise’ and the manner in which resurgent India will attempt to shape its strategic space.

That this scenario is worrisome to the Chinese is indicated by frequent assertion by Chinese scholars that whereas China and India could coexist in Asia, their being partners was implausible. Fundamentally Chinese believe that as both countries rise simultaneously competition between the two is inherent. It is the nature of competition that is often left undefined.

China’s Economic Orbit

Given the current Chinese trade and other indicators, China, barring unforeseen and uncontrolled internal developments will overtake the United States over the next two decades as the largest trading partner of every Asian nation. As trade with China grows rapidly, many of the Southeast Asian states and even countries like Australia, South Korea and even Japan will be drawn into the Chinese economic orbit (if not already so), increasing Chinese influence over these states and critically restraining their strategic choices.

The chance of a war between China and the United States is remote; the Chinese military threat to the United States is only indirect.

This trend, which will be difficult to counter, gives China a growing sense of autonomy on how to build its relationships with other states. In such a scenario the dilemma for India will be whether to be more aggressive in positioning itself as a balancer to China in Southeast Asia and Central Asia both as an economic partner and a player of consequences in the regional organizations, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN +3 (+4) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) etc. Particularly as such a positioning runs the inherent risk of alienating China, for the most part if it is seen as a part of broad based collaborative strategy with the US.

Impact of Chinese Technological Advancement on the Region

Technological developments, now no longer prospects but realities, are already having a strong impact on the Asian region. The case of India is the clearest. It has now undertaken a major programme of force development and modernization that, as the very highest Indian officials have confirmed, is fundamentally a response to China. Evidence suggests that at least some in Russia are increasingly concerned by China’s range of strengths in its weakly-held Far East and Central Asian regions. Why exactly Moscow continues to sell sophisticated arms to China is a difficult question to answer, but money alone cannot be the imperative. Certainly the entire Russian Pacific coast, including Vladivostok, is placed at increasing risk by the new Chinese capabilities.

Southeast Asian states are also concerned, though none, except Singapore, is responding with a really major attempt to strengthen its military – and Singapore, of course, will deny that China has anything to do with it. Of particular concern to this region will be China’s apparent intention to base some of its future SSBN and SSN fleet on Hainan Island, which is closer to deep water patrolling areas. This deployment will also cause China to move more naval and air forces to that island, perhaps even aircraft carriers in the future. This may then lead to more aggressive Chinese behavior to enforce its territorial claims, and more incidents similar to the April 2001 EP-3 incident could occur should the US Navy seek to monitor or contain China’s vital strategic submarines.

Perhaps the best way to sum up the situation is with the current cliché. “The US wants a unipolar world and a multipolar Asia, China wants a unipolar Asia and a multipolar world, while India wants a multipolar Asia and a multipolar world. “one can quibble with this, but the bit about a “unipolar Asia” seems accurate, true to Chinese traditions and confirmed by current activities.

Political scientists believing in “realist” theory of international relations argue that a major challenge to the military balance, such as China is currently mounting, will lead to one of two possible reactions.

States may bend to the new power and accommodate themselves. Or they may seek to form balancing coalitions and seek allies. Unfortunately the theory does not tell us how to know which of these two quite different reactions will be followed in a given case.

China’s Rising Influence and Response of Asian Nations

To accomplish this task, China has built advantageous power relationships both in contiguous territories and in far-flung locales rich in the resources it requires to fuel its growth. Because what drives China abroad has to do with a core national interest — economic survival — China can be defined as an über-realist power. It seeks to develop a sturdy presence throughout the parts of Africa that are well endowed with oil and minerals and wants to secure port access throughout the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, which connect the hydrocarbon-rich Arab-Persian world to the Chinese seaboard.

Having no choice in the matter, Beijing cares little about the type of regime with which it is engaged; it requires stability, not virtue as the West conceives of it. And because some of these regimes -- such as those in Iran, Myanmar (also known as Burma), and Sudan -- are benighted and authoritarian, China’s worldwide scouring for resources brings it into conflict with the missionary-oriented United States, as well as with countries such as India and Russia, against whose own spheres of influence China is bumping up.

The steps Tokyo and Washington are now taking to coordinate military capabilities are very important. As long as Washington does its part, the US-Japan alliance will be secure. It is the real foundation of security and stability in Asia.

To be sure, China is not an existential problem for these states. The chance of a war between China and the United States is remote; the Chinese military threat to the United States is only indirect. The challenge China poses is primarily geographic — notwithstanding critical issues about debt, trade, and global warming. China’s emerging area of influence in Eurasia and Africa is growing, not in the a nineteenth-century imperialistic sense but in a more subtle manner, better suited to the era of globalization. Simply by securing its economic needs, China is shifting the balance of power in the Eastern Hemisphere, and that must mightily concern the United States.

On land and at sea, abetted by China’s favorable location on the map, Beijing’s influence is emanating and expanding from Central Asia to the South China Sea, from the Russian Far East to the Indian Ocean. China is a rising continental power, and, as Napoleon famously said, the policies of such states are inherent in their geography.

The evidence suggests that China is expecting the first reaction : accommodation and acquiescence. Beijing wants paramount influence, it would appear, and expects to achieve it by over-awing its neighbours with military might – but with luck not actually using it. This is very much the approach Sun Tsu endorses. It makes sense to think this is Beijing’s hope, because if this method works, it will be possible to attain hegemony without conflict or even endangering economic links around the world.

What about the other states, however? Here the evidence suggests unwillingness to bend and accommodate, and instead balancing and seeking allies. India is a good example, but so is Japan, which already possesses a strong military, though without force projection capabilities or weapons of mass destruction. Should Japan feel the need, it could rapidly and self-sufficiently create military forces far stronger and more sophisticated than China’s.

For the moment Japan is committed to alliance with the US. The steps Tokyo and Washington are now taking to coordinate military capabilities are very important. As long as Washington does its part, the US-Japan alliance will be secure. It is the real foundation of security and stability in Asia. But if the United States wobbles or be seen as unreliable, then Japan would most likely decide that the time has come to take over its own defence. China fears Japan more than it does any other power. Yet by arming itself with such vigour, China is paradoxically enough, pushing pacifist Japan into doing the same.

Other states in the region are also looking towards greater military self-sufficiency. An arms race has begun, thanks to Beijing, and it has been intensified by the qualitative leaps that foreign technology has permitted. Now we must brace ourselves for the reaction to China’s initiative. As per Clausewitz, in international security no less than in physics, actions elicit reactions. The problem is that in international relations one cannot predict the reactions as in physics.

Intensifying Arms Race Between India and China

How China's resurgence will affect the strategic balance. Visit:

http://oilprice.com/Geo-Politics/Asia/Intensifying-Arms-Race-Between-India-and-China.htmls

China’s resurgence in recent years has jolted the leading powers of the world out of their stupor – and India’s case is no different. Today, forward-looking Indian mandarins are no longer obsessed with Pakistan. New Delhi has started developing strategic plans for dealing with China in 2020 or 2030. Many Indian think tanks are already working on this mission objective and those which are not are gearing up to it.

India is pursuing a China policy that America has practiced for long – emphasising cooperation with China while minimizing competition. It may be the politically correct strategy but it does precious little to counter China’s rapidly increasing military might. Of late, China has become more and more assertive in its diplomatic and military conduct in line with increasingly ambitious global objectives. India, Japan, the US and Russia are indeed mindful of the probable repercussions an increasingly powerful China would have on the international balance of power, particularly when Japan and the US seem unable to maintain their lead.

The Chinese infrastructure drive is an integral part of its “string of pearls” strategy vis-a-vis India. Three ports that China is building in India’s immediate neighbourhood – Gwadar in Pakistan, Sittwe in Myanmar and Hambantota in Sri Lanka – are important pearls in the Chinese string. China has a vibrant presence across South Asia. Besides Pakistan, with which China has a true strategic partnership, Beijing has emerged as a major player in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal and the Maldives. It has firmly entrenched itself in Myanmar (Burma), Mauritius and the Seychelles.

What transpired last month was an eye opener for China-watchers in the Indian government. On 5 August 2010, The People’s Daily reported that two days previously “important combat readiness materials” (read missiles) of the Chinese Air Force were transported safely to Tibet via the Qinghai-Tibet Railway – the first time since such materials were transported to Tibet by railway. It is a clear demonstration by China of not just its technological competence but also its capability to mobilise in Tibet in the event of a Sino-Indian conflict. China already has four fully operational airports in Tibet (the last one started operations in July 2010) while the fifth is scheduled to be inaugurated in October 2010.

Meanwhile, the Chinese Navy’s recent seafaring activities and manoeuvres have revealed Beijing’s intention to increase its control of the maritime sea lanes of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The latter is an obvious cause of concern for India. China’s new-found aggressive posturing and maritime territorial claims in South China Sea – which Beijing has begun to describe as an area of its “core interest”, a term that the Chinese have been using for Tibet, Taiwan and Xinjiang – is of no less concern.

China is building up its naval might in a big way. It is not just India that is confused and concerned about the real intent of Beijing. Japan, the US, South Korea, Vietnam and Taiwan are equally apprehensive. China’s People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) was recently given a green light by the country’s highest military planning body, the Central Military Commission (CMC), to build two new nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. One aircraft carrier – Varyag of the Kuznetsov class – is already under construction. All three aircraft carriers will be available to China by 2017 and will patrol the South China Sea, Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. This will give the the Chinese Navy a blue-water capability to rival the US Navy.
India is far behind China's gargantuan defence capabilities. At the same time, New Delhi is not twiddling its thumbs and sitting idly. India has been conscious of rapidly growing Chinese military capabilities for well over a decade. In fact, the then Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes, while speaking in the aftermath of the May 1998 Indian nuclear tests, had gone on record as saying that China was the number one threat for India.

In 1999, the government of Atal Bihari Vajpayee approved a 30-year submarine construction plan under which 30 submarines were to be constructed. Construction work on at least four nuclear submarines is in full swing, while the indigenously made Arihant nuclear powered submarine has already been launched. India plans to have at least 30 submarines by 2030, but this target may prove to be too stiff. India’s submarine fleet is currently facing depletion and their number is expected to go down to 16 by 2012 with the decommissioning of two Foxtrot submarines in the near future.

In March 2009, the Manmohan Singh government cleared Project 15B under which next generation warships are under various stages of construction. Besides, at least three Kolkata class destroyers are under construction under Project 15A. Two aircraft carriers – INS Vikramaditya (Admiral Gorshkov of Russia) and INS Vikrant – are under construction.

To strike a harmonious balance, the Indian Navy is in the process of beefing up its fleet of stealth frigates and has initiated several new projects in this regard. Shivalik will be India’s first stealth frigate of its class. The Sahyadri and Satpura class of frigates are under advanced stage of construction. All this is as per the government’s plans to maintain a force level of more than 140 warships.

China knows very well that it is not dealing with the India of 1962, when the two countries fought a one-sided war. Then India had deliberately not used its air force against the Chinese to minimize loss of territory and restrict Chinese military gains to the far-flung border areas. Though China retains a decisive lead, New Delhi is determined to stay on Beijing's heals.

By. Rajeev Sharma

Source: Open Democracy

Following the decision of China to extend its Quighai-Tibet Railway up to Mt.Everest base camp or close to Nepal-China border, commentators have their diverse views. The railway also places Nepal in forefront. The recent article in The Economist is also interesting to read. Following is the article: The link of article: http://www.economist.com/node/17204635?story_id=17204635&fsrc=rss

Railways in Tibet

Mount Everest is singing for joy

Everyone else is worried

Oct 7th 2010 | BEIJING

“MOUNT EVEREST is singing for joy and the Brahmaputra River swirling with happiness”. Or so says an official Chinese newspaper (using the Tibetan names, Qomolangma and the Yarlung Tsangpo). After much delay, China has started to extend its controversial railway line in Tibet that will draw more tourists to the mountain and boost trade with South Asia. How happy the outcome will be is not so clear.

Planning for the 253km (157-mile) line from the Tibetan capital, Lhasa, to the region’s second city, Shigatse, began in 2002, four years before Lhasa itself was connected to China’s railway network. The authorities appear not have been deterred by the problems that the railway brought to Lhasa. A tourism boom and a flood of immigrants from China’s interior contributed to an explosion of unrest among embittered Tibetans in March 2008. The launch ceremony in Lhasa of the $2 billion extension on September 26th was celebrated by dancing children in elaborate Tibetan costumes. Chinese television said the line would be of “great significance for the strengthening of ethnic unity”.

Like the route to Lhasa, which crossed the highest terrain of any railway in the world, the single-track extension will involve considerable technical difficulties. Nearly half of it will go through tunnels or over bridges (96 of them). It will cross areas prone to earthquakes, landslides and sand storms. Whereas the line to Lhasa had to traverse unstable permafrost, the new one will be challenged by geothermal fields with hot springs. All this at an oxygen-starved altitude of 3,550-4,000 metres.

The railway will make it easier to reach Mount Everest, which can expect to see a lot more tourists eager to be photographed in front of the world’s highest peak (Shigatse is also due to open an airport soon, Tibet’s fifth for civilian use). In 2007 the Chinese side of the mountain recorded 27,476 visits by Chinese tourists, almost twice as many as in 2006, after the new rail service to Lhasa had opened. Environmentalists are worried.

Shadows over Qomolangma

So are the Indians. The government in Delhi has been nervously watching China’s build-up of infrastructure in Tibet. The extension to Shigatse, besides facilitating military movements near China’s border with India, is likely to boost trade with Nepal, where the two giants are vying for influence in a power struggle that is still going on. China has long-term plans for more extensions of the line, to Nyalam on the border with Nepal and to Dromo near Bhutan and the Indian state of Sikkim. Nepal wants the railway extended to Kathmandu, which India fears would give China more clout in a country India sees as part of its sphere of influence. Another proposed line, from Lhasa east to Nyingchi, would bring the network close to the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, most of which China claims.

Tibetans might have mixed feelings too. The rail link to Lhasa brought disproportionate benefits to ethnic Han Chinese whose language and culture enabled them to take quicker advantage of the Han tourist influx. Tibet Business News said the majority of traders in Shigatse were migrants from beyond Tibet. It quoted a woman from neighbouring Sichuan Province saying that the railway would cut her costs of doing business in Shigatse by half. Expect more like her to come.

Asia

India-China Competition Is Natural ’

Yes. China used to say in the past that they would not interfere in internal affairs of Nepal. This was ritual. But, Chinese used another word saying they will not interfere in Nepal’s affairs and it is unacceptable for them if others make interference.

By RAMESHNATH PANDEY

Former foreign minister RAMESHNATH PANDEY closely watches the political developments in Nepal. In the wake of debates over the external forces making Nepal a battleground, former foreign minister Pandey, who started his career as a journalist and ended up with politics, spoke to KESHAB POUDEL at his residence about the ongoing political process in Nepal. Excerpts:

What is your impression about growing Chinese activities?
For the first time, China has shown its concerns and interests in Nepal. We have to take note of the statement in which the visiting Chinese leader says China will not interfere in internal affairs of Nepal and it is unacceptable for China any interference by others in internal affairs of Nepal.

Do you think it is a major shift in Chinese stand?
Yes. China used to say in the past that they would not interfere in internal affairs of Nepal. This was ritual. But, Chinese used another word saying they will not interfere in Nepal’s affairs and it is unacceptable for them if others make interference. Now the questions come. If other forces interfere or China takes others’ activities as interference, what action will China take? Whatever action it takes, it will put Nepal in a difficult position.

How can Nepal preempt possible accident?
If we failed to complete the peace process in four months as we have committed to the international community, civil war will break out in Nepal and that is going to be a proxy civil war and it will push Nepal into Yugoslavia’s road from Lebanon. It will wipe out Nepal from the international map.

Do you mean the recent statement of Chinese is a warning to south or suggestion for restraints?
I don’t have any confusion that India has security, political and economic concern. It has been there for a long time and it will remain there. India will make its efforts to address it. We have to take it naturally. We should not forget that Chinese security interest in Nepal is also growing. As its security concern in Nepal is growing, we have to take Chinese actions as natural. However, we have to understand the fact that the adventurism shown by our government and other international players in Nepal increases the security concern of Nepal’s two neighbors.

How can Nepal avert the confrontation?
There is a feeling in both the capitals of India and China that Nepal government does not have the capability to look after their genuine concerns and they have to take care of their own interests by themselves. In this situation, we need to convey both the neighbors that we will protect their genuine interests.

How much possibility is there to build mutual confidence in Nepal between India and China on their own interests?
I think you can write a very good essay on the theme but it is impossible in international politics and it is just a wishful thinking. We should not forget the fact that both of Nepal’s neighbors, India and China, are aspiring or global economic powers. There is a competition for leadership between them. There is only one leader and one cannot get the leadership without minimizing the other. If they want to become Asian powers, both the countries need to maintain good relations with their neighbors so that they can concentrate outside.

What is India’s concern in Nepal?
Since the establishment of relations with India in 1947, India has always shown its concern in Nepal regarding its security. She has made every effort to protect her interest in Nepal. It is natural as every big country has concern with smaller country and they make efforts to address that concern by using their influence. We should not take such efforts otherwise.

How do you view India’s relations?
The weakness of Indian foreign policy is that India’s relationship with its entire neighbors is very bad. India’s relations with Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Pakistan are not good. India is trying to build relations with all neighbors but their security feelings and worries are there. India needs to change its stand to build relations with its neighbors on the basis of mutual respect. This is a prerequisite for India.

If India establishes good relations with its neighbors, will it change the relations between India and China?
Despite this, there will be no tangible change between India and China. Their clash of interest will be there. In such a situation, they will come with mutually agreed confidence building measure is just a wishful thinking. This is not practical but theoretical.

But, India and China agreed at the Climate Change summit with the common agenda. Why is not such a possibility there in Nepal?
Nepal is not a country far away from their borders but Nepal is their neighbor having its borders with them. During Copenhagen, Tibet was not an issue but Nepal shares a long border with Tibet. Because Nepal borders with Tibet, China will have a major concern in Nepal. You cannot compare this interest with anything else. Similarly, Nepal’s geo-strategic location is very important for Indian security, at a time when there is internal security threat growing in India. I want to quote BBC’s recent report which said India is fighting with itself. As long as differences persist in many issues, India and China can compete to protect their interests in Nepal. If those kinds of confidence will be built between India and China, it will be good for Nepal’s future and prosperity. Since China is aspiring for world power, it has different interests than India.
It is reported that Nepal’s two neighbors are worried about the presence of western forces, UNMIN and OHCHR.

Don’t you think they come together to maintain their influence?
There will be no substitution for UNMIN and China will not feel secure with the presence of anybody. It may feel secure under the presence of UNMIN since it is one of the members of P5. Even for India, the best bet will be UN.

How can Nepal safeguard the interests of both the neighbors?
For both the neighbors, the best option will be strong, stable and prosperous Nepal. We should not forget the principle that a big country feels secure when a small country is stable. Had Afghanistan been secure and stable, peaceful and prosperous, Bin Laden would not have been born. One cannot make the global environment secure by turning a small country insecure and chaotic. It will not make any power safe in case of chaos in a smaller country.

Do you think China is reliable and trustworthy as in the past?
We need to give up a phobia of past that China will come to help us in the crisis. How much is China trustful? We need to be clear on that. When we established our relations with China, it was in isolation and was weaker internally and poor. China was very friendly and trustful at that time towards her friends and friends relied on it.

Why are you suspecting China?
Now China is a different country and it has already become an economic power. China is sustaining American economy. China has strengthened its capability globally and it is stronger. What will be present China’s attitude? Will it be different than old China or similar? We have yet to test it, whether China is dependable to its old allies or not. If we have built our own thinking based on old perception, it may be right or wrong. It will be risky.

What is required then?
We need to earn the trust of both of our neighbors. We have to give confidence to both of our neighbors that their interest is properly protected in Nepal. Nepal’s interest will not be served as long as Nepal does not guarantee this. We have challenges and opportunities as well.

What do we need to do to protect our interest?
We cannot protect our interest without addressing genuine concerns of both the neighbors. Nepal has much opportunity as well. The big market of Nepal’s two neighbors can bring prosperity to Nepal. If we create a situation favorable to us, we can change the world. We must act as a bridge to increase understanding between two neighbors. In this situation, we can protect our interest as well as can bring prosperity. Nepal can also prevent possible conflict between India and China and it will be major contribution in the global peace.

How do you assess India, China relations?
Conflict between India and China is growing. We have to read two statements of Indian prime minister and defense minister which showed that the conflict between India and China is growing and there is war of words between them. Since both the countries have matured leadership, this conflict will not bring any war. But the trends showed that war of words will increase further.

What will happen after four months when the tenure of UNMIN is completed?
I hope for the best that everything will be completed, including the peace process in four months. We need to be clear that it is not the UN responsibility to conclude the peace process. UNMIN can supervise and support and assist the peace process. Mistrust is growing between the political parties and there is a deficit of trust between UNMIN and Nepal. In this situation, I can see lesser possibility of completion of the peace process.

Will UNMIN tenure be extended again?
UN has already decided to pull out UNMIN in four months. Even if extension is required, we need to take a very strong initiative to persuade the Security Council again. Given Nepal’s present quality of leadership, I don’t think we have such a diplomatic capability.

What will be other options?
Once UNMIN is pulled out, UN secretary general’s statement includes the word ‘alternative’ arrangements in case Nepal’s peace process remains incomplete. There is a big question what that ‘alternative’ means. Nepal has not made any efforts to seek clarification on that word.
Don’t you see there will be a vacuum after UNMIN leaves?
When UNMIN leaves, there will be a big vacuum and there is no institution which is capable to fill it. One group argues that political parties have the capability for this. If they are capable, why do not they settle the peace process? If external force tries to fill that vacuum, it will be a major disaster for Nepal.

Which external force is that?
All of us know which force has largest security stake in Nepal but it is not in an interest of external force. Nobody can justify it to replace UNMIN.

If the southern neighbor tries to fill that vacuum, what will be the reaction from the north?
The north will definitely react in many forms. We should not forget that effects of Nepal’s chaos and instability directly spill over to India and China. If Nepal’s chaos affects these two emerging powers, it will affect the peace and stability of the region and the world. Its ramifications will be much more serious and larger than what we are expecting.

How do you look at the current row between the UN and Nepal?
We had made a blunder when we wrote a letter to the United Nations. The letter shattered more than 53-year old good relations between Nepal and the UN. Nepal is widely respected in the UN as it has made very important contributions against apartheid. When Dag Hammarskjöld was killed in a plane crash in Congo in 1961, the UN set up an inquiry commission, which was led by Nepalese foreign minister Rishikesh Shah. Nepal was given such a huge responsibility and regard. When the UN won the Nobel Peace Prize, then secretary general took the Nepalese Army officer to accept that Noble Peace Prize.

If that is so why did Nepal take such a decision?
I think a conspiracy against Nepal is going on and we are playing at their hands. The efforts are going on to show international community that Nepal is a weak nation, it is incapable to take decisions on its own and there are wide divisions and differences among major political parties.